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Abstract
Discrete-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of states have been widely ap-
plied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic en-
vironments. However, these games su®er from a \curse of dimensionality" since the cost
of computing players' expectations over all possible future states increases exponentially
in the number of state variables. We explore the alternative of continuous-time stochas-
tic games with a ¯nite number of states, and show that continuous time has substantial
computational and conceptual advantages. Most important, continuous time avoids the
curse of dimensionality, thereby speeding up the computations by orders of magnitude
in games with more than a few state variables. Overall, the continuous-time approach
opens the way to analyze more complex and realistic stochastic games than currently
feasible.
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11 Introduction
The usefulness of discrete-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of states is limited by
their computational burden; in particular, there is a \curse of dimensionality" since the cost
of computing players' expectations over all possible future states increases exponentially in
the number of state variables. We examine the alternative of continuous-time games with
a ¯nite number of states and show that they avoid the curse of dimensionality. Hence,
continuous-time games with more than a few state variables are orders of magnitude faster
to solve than their discrete-time counterparts. In addition, we argue that continuous-time
formulations of games are as natural, if not more natural, than discrete-time speci¯cations.
Overall, continuous time o®ers a computationally and conceptually promising approach to
modeling dynamic strategic interactions.
Discrete-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of states have a long tradition
in economics. Dating back to Shapley (1953), they have become central to the analysis
of strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. A well-
known example is the Ericson & Pakes (1995) (hereafter, EP) model of dynamic competition
in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit, which has triggered a large and
active literature in industrial organization (see Pakes (2000) for a survey) and, most recently,
has been used also in other ¯elds such as international trade (Erdem & Tybout 2003) and
¯nance (Goettler, Parlour & Rajan 2004). Since models like these are generally too complex
to be solved analytically, Pakes & McGuire (1994) (hereafter, PM1) present an algorithm
to solve numerically for a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Unfortunately, the range of applications of discrete-time, ¯nite-state stochastic games
is limited by their high computational cost. As Pakes & McGuire (2001) (hereafter, PM2)
point out, computing players' expectations over all possible future states of the game is
subject to a curse of dimensionality in that the computational burden is increasing expo-
nentially in the number of state variables, i.e., the dimension of the state vector. Suppose
that a player can move to one of K states from one period to the next. Given that there
are K possibilities for each of N players, there are KN possibilities for the future state of
the game, and computing the expectation over all these successor states therefore involves
summing over KN terms. Because of this exponential increase of the computational burden,
applications of discrete-time games are constrained to a handful of players. The computa-
tional burden also restricts heterogeneity among players. For example, a typical application
of EP's framework may allow the competing ¯rms to di®er from each other in terms of either
their production capacity or their product quality, but not both. In short, the computa-
tional constraints are often binding in important problems and, as Pakes (2000) contends,
this causes modeling choices to \become dominated by their computational (rather than
their substantive) implications" (p. 38).
In this paper we develop the alternative of continuous-time stochastic games with a
2¯nite number of states and propose suitable algorithms.1 To the extent that continuous-
time, ¯nite-state Markov processes are less familiar than their discrete-time counterparts,
continuous-time games may be slightly more cumbersome to formulate. However, they have
substantial advantages. First, continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality in com-
puting expectations. In contrast to a discrete-time game, the possibility of two or more
players' states changing simultaneously disappears in a continuous-time game under stan-
dard assumptions on the transition laws. This is not a restriction on the behavior of players;
rather it re°ects the fact that changes happen one by one as time passes. The absence of
simultaneous changes implies that the expectation over successor states in the discrete-time
game is replaced by a much smaller sum in the continuous-time game and results in a sim-
pler, and computationally much more tractable, model: while computing the expectation
over successor states in the discrete-time game involves summing over KN terms, it merely
requires adding up (K ¡1)N terms in the continuous-time game. This eliminates the curse
of dimensionality and accelerates the computations by orders of magnitude for games with
more than a few state variables. For example, the discrete-time algorithm uses over 84
hours per iteration in a model with N = 14 state variables and K = 3 possible transitions
per state variable while our continuous-time algorithm uses 4:27 seconds per iteration, over
70;000 times faster.
Second, prior to adding them up, both the continuous- and the discrete-time algorithms
need to look up in computer memory each of the terms that enter in the expectation over suc-
cessor states. This requires the algorithms to compute the addresses of the successor states
in computer memory and imposes a further cost. One way to speed up the computations
is to compute these addresses once and then store them for future reference. Precomputed
addresses decrease running times but increase memory requirements. Therefore, this com-
putational strategy is infeasible in all but the smallest discrete-time games since the number
of successor states, KN, is quite large, but it is feasible in continuous-time games since the
number of successor states, (K ¡ 1)N, is much smaller. Precomputed addresses give a
further advantage to continuous time: with precomputed addresses the continuous-time
algorithm uses 2:93 seconds per iteration in the above example with N = 14 state vari-
ables compared to 4:27 seconds without precomputed addresses. Combining these gains,
continuous time is over 100;000 times faster than discrete time.
In sum, each iteration of the continuous-time algorithm is far faster than its discrete-
time equivalent. Partly o®setting this is the fact that for comparable games the continuous-
time algorithm needs more iterations to converge to the equilibrium. However, the loss
in the number of iterations is small when compared to the gains from avoiding the curse
of dimensionality and precomputed addresses. In the above example with N = 14 state
1Our approach di®ers from continuous-time games with a continuum of states which date back to Isaacs
(1954) (zero-sum games) and Starr & Ho (1969) (nonzero-sum games); see Basar & Olsder (1999) for a
standard presentation of di®erential games and Dockner, Jorgensen, Van Long & Sorger (2000) for a survey
of applications.
3variables, continuous time beats discrete time by a factor of almost 30;000. To put this
number in perspective, while it takes about 20 minutes to compute the equilibrium of the
continuous-time game, it would take over a year to do the same in discrete time!
The curse of dimensionality in integration is recognized as an important problem in
numerical analysis in general (see, e.g., Davis & Rabinowitz (1984) on integration). To
alleviate its impact on computing equilibria of discrete-time, ¯nite-state stochastic games,
PM2 develop a stochastic approximation algorithm. Their idea is to create approximations
to players' expectations over all possible future states and update them each time a state
is visited by a random draw from the set of successor states. Similar to Monte Carlo
integration, many visits to a state are required to reduce the approximation error to an
acceptable level and obtain useful estimates of these expectations.
In addition to breaking the curse of dimensionality in computing expectations over
successor states, PM2 address another issue in computing equilibria of dynamic stochastic
games, namely the large size of the state space. If the states of the game are given by
the Cartesian product of the states of the players, then the number of states su®ers from
yet another curse of dimensionality. However, many games, in particular all applications
of EP's framework, make additional assumptions on the model's primitives (i.e., payo®
functions and transition laws) and restrict attention to symmetric and anonymous equilibria.
The number of states that have to be examined to compute a symmetric and anonymous
equilibrium grows polynomially instead of exponentially in the number of state variables
(see Section 3.4 for details). Even though there is no curse of dimensionality in the formal
sense, the polynomial growth is arguably a challenge. The PM2 algorithm addresses it by
tracking the states that appear to be visited frequently in equilibrium, i.e., are in the ergodic
set, and ignoring the rest.
In this paper we compute players' values (i.e., payo®s) and policies (i.e., strategies) at
all states, making no attempt to address the large size of the state space. We do this for a
variety of reasons. First, many applications require knowledge of the equilibrium on states
outside the ergodic set. For example, in any model of a young and growing industry, it is
unlikely that the initial state and the transition path are in the ergodic set. Similarly, if the
goal is to study the e®ect of a change in antitrust policy, then the initial state generated
by the old regime may not be in the ergodic set induced by the equilibrium under the new
regime, so that the transition from the old to the new regime cannot be accurately captured
unless the equilibrium is computed on the transient states. In practice, this can be done
via multiple restarts of the algorithm, but at additional cost. Second, as PM2 acknowledge,
their algorithm needs to be signi¯cantly altered in order to solve models in which behavior
depends on players' values and policies \o® the equilibrium path," as is typically the case in
models of collusion, since o®-path states are by de¯nition never visited in equilibrium (PM2,
p. 1278). Third, the ergodic set is large in many dynamic stochastic games, so that there
is little gain from focusing on the ergodic set. For example, in Doraszelski & Markovich
4(2004) the ergodic set consists of the entire state space. Fourth, the number of states is
independent of the concept of time. In order to contrast the discrete- and continuous-time
approaches to stochastic games, we attend to issues such as those related to computing the
expectation over successor states that are speci¯c to the concept of time. We note, however,
that our continuous-time algorithm can be extended to focus on the ergodic set and that
this may result in improvements similar to those reported in PM2 in some applications.
Since PM2 exploit other ideas besides stochastic approximation whereas we restrict
attention to the problem of computing the expectation over successor states, it is di±cult
to compare their algorithm with our continuous-time approach. However, to give the reader
some basis for comparison, we note that PM2 report that their algorithm cuts running time
roughly in half (relative to PM1) in a model with 6 state variables where the ergodic set
comprises about 3.3% of all states. They also project that it reduces running time by a factor
of 250 in a model with 10 state variables and an ergodic set containing 0.4% of all states.
In contrast, our continuous-time approach avoids approximations altogether, computes the
equilibrium on the entire state space, and still reduces running time by a factor of 12 and
524, respectively, in similar models with 6 and 10 state variables.
Besides their computational advantages, continuous-time games have a number of fea-
tures that may be useful in modeling dynamic strategic interactions. First, continuous time
gives the researcher more freedom to choose functional forms that are not only tractable
but also easy to interpret. For example, one can more easily specify proportional depre-
ciation in continuous-time models. Second, in continuous-time models there is no limit to
the number of changes in the state of the game that can occur in any ¯nite interval of
time. This makes it easier to interpret data that does not arrive at ¯xed points in time. In
general, the frequency of changes in the state of the game is governed by players' actions in
equilibrium and not predetermined by the unit of time as in discrete-time models. Third,
in continuous-time models players are able to react swiftly to changes in the strategic sit-
uation. To the extent that the state space is fairly coarse in many applications, changes
typically have a signi¯cant impact on the environment and a swift reaction may thus be
deemed more realistic than the delayed response of discrete-time models.
From the standpoint of theory a continuous-time model is similar to a discrete-time
model with short periods. Indeed, as the length of a period goes to zero, the di®erences
between continuous- and discrete-time models disappear. Practical considerations, however,
prohibit short periods in discrete-time models. In a discrete-time model the period length
is implicitly determined by the discount rate, and the lower the discount rate, the slower is
the convergence of the discrete-time algorithm (see Section 5.2 for details). In a continuous-
time model, on the other hand, the length of a period is essentially zero, but we show that
this does not pose a problem for the continuous-time algorithm. Moreover, it is precisely in
the limit that the curse of dimensionality disappears and we obtain a dramatic reduction
in the computational burden. Thus, from the standpoint of computation, continuous-time
5models are often superior to discrete-time models.
Overall, the computational and conceptual advantages of continuous-time games are
substantial and open the way to study more complex and realistic stochastic games than
currently feasible. In addition, the much smaller computational burden of continuous-
time games has at least two other bene¯ts. First, the quite large computational burden
of discrete-time games often limits the researcher to computing the equilibrium for just
a few sets or, in the extreme, for just one set of parameter values (e.g., Fershtman &
Pakes 2000). While one parameterization is su±cient to demonstrate that something can
happen in equilibrium, one parameterization is insu±cient to delineate the conditions un-
der which it does. Neither does one parameterization su±ce to explore the comparative
statics/dynamics properties of the equilibrium. Gaining a more thorough understanding of
strategic behavior in dynamic settings therefore requires the ability to compute equilibria
quickly for many di®erent parameterizations. Second, our continuous-time approach may
be useful in empirical work on stochastic games since many standard estimation procedures
require computing the equilibrium hundreds or even thousands of times.2 But even if the
goal is simply to conduct policy experiments based on estimated parameters, the ability to
compute equilibria quickly is key to establishing the robustness of the conclusions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic elements
of discrete- and continuous-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of states. Section 3
presents the computational strategies for both models and shows that continuous time
avoids the curse of dimensionality inherent in discrete-time models. Section 4 formulates
discrete- and continuous-time versions of the quality ladder model used in PM1. Section 5
compares the performance of the discrete- and continuous-time algorithms and Section 6
argues that continuous-time models have a number of conceptual advantages in addition to
their computational advantages. Section 7 concludes.
2 Models
In this section we describe the discrete- and continuous-time approaches to ¯nite-state
stochastic games.
2.1 Discrete-Time Model
A discrete-time stochastic game with a ¯nite number of states is often just called a \stochas-
tic game" (Filar & Vrieze 1997, Basar & Olsder 1999). The EP model of industry dynamics
is an example of this type of game. Time is discrete and the horizon is in¯nite. We let
­ denote the ¯nite set of possible states; the state of the game in period t is !t 2 ­. We
2Recently two-step estimation procedures have been proposed (Aguirregabiria & Mira 2002, Bajari,
Benkard & Levin 2004, Pakes, Ostrovsky & Berry 2004, Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler 2003) that avoid
computing the equilibrium but entail a loss of e±ciency.
6assume that there are N players. Player i's action (also called his control or policy) in
period t is xi
t 2 Xi (!t), where Xi (!t) is the set of feasible actions for player i in state !t.
We make no speci¯c assumptions about Xi (!t), which may be one- or multidimensional,

















The state follows a controlled discrete-time, ¯nite-state, ¯rst-order Markov process.
Speci¯cally, if the state in period t is !t and the players choose actions xt, then the prob-
ability that the state in period t + 1 is !0 is Pr(!0j!t;xt). In applications such as EP, !t
is a vector partitioned into (!1
t;:::;!N
t ), where !i
t denotes the (one or more) coordinates
of the state that describe player i (e.g., the player's production capacity and/or product
quality). We refer to !i
t as the state of player i and to !t as the state of the game. Many
applications assume that transitions in player i's state are controlled by player i's actions
and are independent of the actions of other players and transitions in their states. In this






















is the transition probability for player i's state. Our example
in Section 4 assumes independent transitions since this allows us to cleanly illustrate the
computational advantages of continuous time but, as we point out in Section 3.3, our insights
are not limited to this special case.
We decompose payo®s into two components. First, in period t player i receives a payo®
equal to ¼i(xt;!t) when players' actions are xt and the state is !t. For example, if !t is a
list of ¯rms' capacities and xt lists their output and investment decisions, then ¼i(xt;!t)
represents ¯rm i's pro¯t from product market competition net of investment expenses.
Second, at the end of period t player i receives a payo® if there is a change in the state.
Speci¯cally, ©i (xt;!t;!t+1) is the change in the wealth of player i at the end of period t
if the state moves from !t to !t+1 6= !t (think of the transition as occurring at the end
of the period) and players' actions were xt.3 For example, if a ¯rm searches for a buyer
of a piece of equipment it wants to sell and sets a reservation price, both the search e®ort
and the reservation price are coded in xi
t. If the ¯rm succeeds in ¯nding an acceptable
buyer, the state changes and the ¯rm receives a payment equal to ©i(xt;!t;!t+1). In
general, ©i (xt;!t;!t+1) depends on the nature of the transition (e.g., selling some or all
equipment) and may be a®ected by the search e®ort of the ¯rm prior to the sale as well as
its reservation price. While ¼i(xt;!t) is paid out at the beginning of the period, we assume
that ©i(xt;!t;!t+1) accrues at the end. This representation of payo®s allows us to capture
many features of models of industry dynamics, including entry and exit.
Players discount future payo®s using a discount factor ¯ 2 [0;1). The objective of player
3We set ©
i(xt;!t;!t) = 0 without loss of generality.










where ©i(xt;!t;!t+1) is discounted (relative to ¼i(xt;!t)) due to our assumption that it
accrues at the end of the period after a change in the state has occurred.4
As is done in many applications of dynamic stochastic games, we focus on Markov perfect
(a.k.a., feedback) equilibria. Hence, player i's strategy maps the set of possible states ­
into his set of feasible actions Xi(!t). Let V i(!) denote the expected net present value of
future cash °ows to player i if the current state is !. Suppose that the other players use
strategies X¡i (!). Then the Bellman equation for player i is














The Bellman equation adds the current cash °ow of player i, ¼i(xi;X¡i (!);!), to the
appropriately discounted expected future cash °ow,
E!0
©





where the expectation is taken over the successor states !0. Player i's strategy is given by














Each player has his own version of equations (1) and (2). The system of equations de¯ned
by the collection of (1) and (2) for each player i = 1;:::;N and each state ! 2 ­ de¯nes a
Markov perfect equilibrium.5
2.2 Continuous-Time Model
We next describe the continuous-time stochastic game with a ¯nite number of states. As
with the discrete-time model, the horizon is in¯nite, the state of the game at time t is
!t 2 ­, there are N players, and player i's action at time t is denoted by xi
t 2 Xi (!t). The
key di®erence is that the state in the continuous-time model follows a controlled continuous-
time, ¯nite-state Markov process. In discrete time the time path of the state is a sequence,
but in continuous time the path is a piecewise-constant, right-continuous function of time.
Jumps occur at random times according to a controlled nonhomogenous Poisson process.
At time t the hazard rate of a jump occurring is Á(xt;!t). If a jump occurs at time t, then
4Discounting ©
i(¢) is without loss of generality because it can always be replaced by ~ ©
i(¢) = ¯©
i(¢), the
net present value of ©
i(¢) at the beginning of the period.
5Similar to PM1 and PM2, we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria. Doraszelski & Satterthwaite
(2003) establish the existence of such equilibria in EP's framework.
8the probability that the state moves to !0 is f (!0j!t¡;xt¡), where !t¡ = lims!t¡ !s is the
state just before the jump and xt¡ = lims!t¡ xs are players' actions just before the jump.
That is, f (!0j!t¡;xt¡) characterizes the transitions of the embedded ¯rst-order Markov
process. Since a jump from a state to itself does not change the game, we simply ignore it
and instead adjust, without loss of generality, the hazard rate of a jump occurring so that
f (!t¡j!t¡;xt¡) = 0.
This decomposition of jumps into a hazard rate and a transition probability is a conve-
nient representation of the controlled continuous-time, ¯nite-state Markov process. Over a
short interval of time of length ¢ > 0 the law of motion is























































is the hazard rate of a change in the state of the game.
This last equality reveals a critical fact about continuous-time Markov processes: during a
short interval of time, there will be (with probability in¯nitesimally close to one) at most
one jump. In the discrete-time model we must keep track of all possible combinations of
players' transitions between time t and time t + 1. The possibility of two or more players'
states changing simultaneously disappears in the continuous-time model; this results in a
simpler, and computationally much more tractable, model.
The remaining aspects of the continuous-time model are essentially the same as in the
discrete-time model. The payo® of player i consists of two components. First, player i
receives a payo® °ow equal to ¼i (xt;!t) when players' actions are xt and the state is !t.
Second, ©i(xt¡;!t¡;!t) is the instantaneous change in the wealth of player i at time t
if the state moves from !t¡ to !t 6= !t¡ and players' actions just before the jump were
xt¡. Similar to the discrete-time model, ¼i(xt;!t) may capture ¯rm i's pro¯t from product
market competition net of investment expenses and ©i(xt¡;!t¡;!t) the scrap value that the
¯rm receives upon exiting the industry or the setup cost that it incurs upon entering the
industry. Unlike the discrete-time model, there is a clear-cut distinction between ¼i(xt;!t)
and ©i(xt¡;!t¡;!t) in the continuous-time model: ¼i(xt;!t) represents a °ow of money,
expressed in dollars per unit of time, whereas ©i(xt¡;!t¡;!t) represents a change in the
stock of wealth, expressed in dollars. As in the discrete-time game, this representation of
payo®s can represent many dynamic phenomena; for example, the Appendix gives details
on modeling entry and exit in our continuous-time game.
Players discount future payo®s using a discount rate ½ > 0. The objective of player i is














where Tm is the random time of the m'th jump in the state, xT¡
m are players' actions just
before the m'th jump, !T¡
m is the state just before the m'th jump, and !Tm is the state just
after the m'th jump.
The Bellman equation for player i is similar to the one in discrete time. To see this note
that over a short interval of time of length ¢ > 0 player i solves the dynamic programming
problem given by






































which, as ¢ ! 0, simpli¯es to the Bellman equation




















Hence, V i(!) can be interpreted as the asset value to player i of participating in the game.
This asset is priced by requiring that the opportunity cost of holding it, ½V i(!), equals the









times the hazard rate of a jump occurring, Á(xi;X¡i (!);!).
10In the special case of independent transitions, player i solves the problem





































































which, as ¢ ! 0, simpli¯es to the Bellman equation














































Similar to the discrete-time model, player i's strategy is found by carrying out the maxi-
mization on the RHS of equation (3) or (4).
3 Computational Strategies
Next we present the computational strategies for the discrete- and continuous-time models
and show that continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality inherent in discrete-time
models.
3.1 Discrete-Time Algorithm
The algorithm is iterative. First we order the states in ­ and make initial guesses for the
value V i(!) and the policy Xi(!) of each player i = 1;:::;N in each state ! 2 ­. Then
we update these guesses as we proceed through the state space in the pre-speci¯ed order.
Speci¯cally, in state ! 2 ­, given old guesses V i(!) and Xi(!) we compute new guesses
11^ V i(!) and ^ Xi(!) for each player i = 1;:::;N as follows:























+ V i ¡
!0¢
j!; ^ Xi(!);X¡i (!)
o
: (6)
Note that the old guesses for the policies of player i's opponents, X¡i(!), and the old guess
for player i's value, V i (!), are used when computing the new guesses ^ V i (!) and ^ Xi (!).
This procedure is, therefore, a Gauss-Jacobi scheme at each state ! 2 ­.
There are two ways to update V i(!) and Xi(!). PM1 suggest a Gauss-Jacobi scheme
that computes ^ V i (!) and ^ Xi (!) for all players i = 1;:::;N and all states ! 2 ­ before
replacing the old guesses with the new guesses, as in
Xi (!) Ã ^ Xi (!);
V i (!) Ã ^ V i (!):
Their value function iteration approach is also called a pre-Gauss-Jacobi method in the
literature on nonlinear equations (see Judd (1998) for a more extensive discussion of Gauss-
Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel methods). In contrast to PM1, we employ the block Gauss-Seidel
scheme that is typically used for discrete-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of
states (e.g., Benkard 2004). In our block Gauss-Seidel scheme, immediately after computing
^ V i (!) and ^ Xi (!) for all players i = 1;:::;N and a given state ! 2 ­, we replace the old
guesses with the new guesses for that state. This has the advantage that \information" is
used as soon as it becomes available. The algorithm cycles through the state space until
the changes in the value and policy functions are deemed small.
3.2 Continuous-Time Algorithm
In its basic form our computational strategy adapts the block Gauss-Seidel scheme to the
continuous-time model. The sole change is that to update players' values and policies in
12state ! 2 ­, we replace equations (5) and (6) by
















































+ V i ¡
!0¢
j!; ^ Xi(!);X¡i (!)
o
: (8)
The remainder of the algorithm proceeds as before. Note that by dividing through by
½+Á( ^ Xi(!);X¡i(!);!), we ensure that equation (8) is contractive for a given player (holding
¯xed the policies of all players) since
Á( ^ Xi(!);X¡i(!);!)
½ + Á( ^ Xi(!);X¡i(!);!)
< 1
as long as the hazard rate is bounded above. Note that the contraction factor varies with
players' policies. In the discrete-time model, by contrast, the contraction factor equals the
discount factor ¯. Unfortunately, the system of equations that de¯nes the equilibrium is not
contractive, and hence neither our continuous- nor our discrete-time algorithm is guaranteed
to converge.
3.3 Avoiding the Curse of Dimensionality
The key di±culty of the discrete-time model is computing the expectation over successor
states in equations (5) and (6). Dropping the distinction between old and new guesses and

















which involves summing over all states !0 such that Pr(!0j!;X(!)) > 0. A clean case arises
if transitions are independent across players and each transition is restricted to going one
level up, one level down, or staying the same, i.e., (!0)
i 2
©
!i ¡ 1;!i;!i + 1
ª
. Then the



















13More generally, if each player can move to one of K states, then the expectation involves
summing over KN terms and grows exponentially in N.
The main advantage of the continuous-time model now becomes clear. If transitions are








, then the N-dimensional expectation over successor states






















In the continuous-time model, we need to sum over a total of 2N terms compared to 3N
terms in the discrete-time model. More generally, if each player can move to one of K states,
then computing the expectation over successor states involves summing over (K¡1)N terms
in the continuous-time model but KN terms in the discrete-time model. Since (K ¡ 1)N
grows linearly rather than exponentially with N, computing the expectation over successor
states is no longer subject to the curse of dimensionality.
The curse of dimensionality becomes even more severe in applications where each player
is described by D > 1 coordinates of the state (e.g., Benkard 2004, Langohr 2003). In
this case computing the expectation over successor states in the discrete-time model in-
volves summing over KND terms compared to (K ¡ 1)ND terms in the continuous-time
model. What matters is the total number of coordinates of the state vector. The curse
of dimensionality is just as severe in a single-agent dynamic programming problem with a
ND-dimensional state vector as in a N-player discrete-time stochastic game with a ND-
dimensional state vector. Similarly, common states that a®ect the current payo®s of all
players are computationally more burdensome in the discrete- than in the continuous-time
model. Suppose, for example, that in addition to players' states that describe ¯rm-speci¯c
production capacities there is a common state such as industry demand (e.g., Besanko &
Doraszelski 2004). If the common state can move to L possible levels and each player can
move to one of K states, then the summation is over LKN terms in discrete time but
L ¡ 1 + (K ¡ 1)N terms in continuous time.
In contrast to common states, common shocks that a®ect the states the players can move
to in a uniform fashion contribute equally to the number of summands in both models. EP,
for example, assume that ¯rm i's state evolves according to the law of motion (!0)
i =
!i + ¿i ¡ ´, where ¿i 2 f0;1g is a binary random variable governed by ¯rm i's investment
decision and ´ 2 f0;1g is an industry-wide depreciation shock. Hence, computing the
expectation over successor states in the discrete-time model involves summing over 2 £ 2N
terms compared to 2£2N terms in the continuous-time model. Nevertheless, as long as the
6Here we exploit the fact that, unlike in the discrete-time model, there is no need to explicitly consider
the possibility of remaining in the same state.
14transition probabilities for the coordinates of the state exhibit less than perfect correlation
the continuous-time model has a signi¯cant advantage over the discrete-time model.7
3.4 Precomputed Addresses, Symmetry, and Anonymity
The ¯rst advantage of continuous time is that it avoids the curse of dimensionality in
computing the expectation over successor states. We next describe a way to further speed
up this computation. To understand this suggestion we need to brie°y discuss the nuts-
and-bolts of computer storage. Any algorithm must store the value and policy functions
in some table that we denote M. Each row of this table corresponds to a state ! 2 ­




of values and policies for
all players in that state. Consider the expectation over successor states in the discrete-time
model as given by equation (9). To compute this sum, the algorithm must ¯nd the rows


















where C (!0;i) is the column in row R(!0) that contains the value for player i in state !0 and
N+1;:::;2N are the columns in row R(!) that contain the policies for players j = 1;:::;N
in state !. In the continuous-time model the expression for the expectation over successor
states is analogous except that Pr(¢) is replaced by f(¢). Equation (10) displays all the





there are two kinds of costs involved. The ¯rst is the summation over all states !0 such that
Pr(!0j!;X(!)) > 0 and the second is the computation of the address, R(!0) and C(!0;i),
of the value of player i at each of them. One way to reduce running times is to precompute
these addresses and store them along with the values and policies for state !. More precisely,
for each successor state !0 of state ! we append a vector (R(!0);C(!0;1);:::;C(!0;N)) of






Precomputed addresses decrease running times but increase memory requirements since
N +1 numbers need to be stored for each successor state. The practicality of this computa-
tional strategy hinges on the number of successor states. As we have shown in Section 3.3,
this number is much smaller in the continuous- than in the discrete-time model. For exam-
ple, if transitions are independent across players and each transition is restricted to going
one level up, one level down, or staying the same, then there are 2N successor states in
the continuous-time model but 3N in the discrete-time model. Hence, this computational
7It is possible to specify models that are as demanding in continuous time than they are in discrete time.
Consider, for example, the law of motion that assigns equal probability to transitions from any state ! 2 ­
to any other state !
0 2 ­, where !
0 6= !: Pr(!
0j!;x) =
1




j­j¡1 in continuous time, and the expectation over successor states involves j­j ¡ 1 terms
in both cases. We are, however, not aware of an economic problem that leads to such a speci¯cation.
15strategy is infeasible except in the smallest discrete-time models. Precomputed addresses
are therefore another advantage that is essentially only available in continuous time.
The usefulness of precomputed addresses further depends on how hard it is to evaluate
R(!) and C(!;i). In some cases, this is quite easy and there is little to be gained from this
computational strategy. For example, suppose that the set of player i's possible states is
f1;:::;Mg. In the absence of restrictions such as symmetry and anonymity the state space
is ­ = f1;:::;MgN. Hence, ! is the base M representation of













and C(!;i) = i.
Evaluating R(!) and C(!;i), however, becomes much harder once symmetry and anonymity
are invoked, as is always done in applications of EP's framework in order to slow down the
growth of the state space in N and M. Under suitable conditions on the model's primitives
(i.e., payo® functions and transition laws), it is possible to restrict attention to symmetric




, then player i's value is given by
V i(!) = V 1(!i;!2;:::;!i¡1;!1;!i+1;:::)
and similarly for player i's policy. Therefore, symmetry allows us to focus on the problem
of player 1. Furthermore, anonymity (also called exchangeability) says that player 1 does
not care about the identity of its competitors, only about the distribution of their states.
Hence, for all 2 · j < k,
V 1(!) = V 1(!1;:::;!j¡1;!k;!j+1;:::;!k¡1;!j;!k+1;:::)
and similarly for player i's policy (see Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2003) for a detailed
discussion of symmetry and anonymity).
In practice, symmetry and anonymity are imposed by limiting the computation of play-
ers' values and policies to states in the set ¹ ­ = f(!1;!2;:::;!N) 2 ­ : !1 · !2 · ::: · !Ng.8
Whereas ­ grows exponentially in N, ¹ ­ grows polynomially. More speci¯cally, impos-
ing symmetry and anonymity reduces the number of states to be examined from j­j =
MN to j¹ ­j =
(N+M¡1)!
N!(M¡1)! , but makes R(!) and C(!;i) much harder to compute. Pakes,
Gowrisankaran & McGuire (1993) and Gowrisankaran (1999) propose slightly di®erent
methods for mapping the elements of ¹ ­ into consecutive integers. These methods form
the basis for computing R(!), but require that ! 2 ¹ ­. While this is achieved by sorting
the coordinates of the vector !, sorting implies that C(!;i) is no longer always equal to i.
Suppose that the state of the game is (1;1;3) and that ¯rm 1 moves to state 2. Hence, the
8Some additional restrictions are needed to obtain a symmetric and anonymous equilibria. If N = 2, for
example, symmetry requires that V
1(1;1) = V
2(1;1).
16state becomes (2;1;3) or, after sorting, (1;2;3) so that C((2;1;3);1) = 2, C((2;1;3);2) = 1,
and C((2;1;3);3) = 3. Since evaluating R(!) and C(!;i) is rather involved, there is a lot
to be gained from precomputed addresses, see Section 5.
4 Example: The Pakes & McGuire (1994) Quality Ladder
Model
We use the quality ladder model developed in PM1 to demonstrate the computational
advantages of continuous time in Section 5. Below we ¯rst describe their model and then
we reformulate it in continuous time. We want to focus on a simple example that highlights
the numerical issues. We also want to avoid existence problems that may arise from the
discrete nature of ¯rms' entry and exit decision (see Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2003) for
details and a way to resolve these di±culties). Therefore, we abstract from entry and exit,
and set ©i(x;!;!0) = 0. This allows us to make clean performance comparisons between
the discrete- and continuous-time algorithms. Since entry and exit are important features
of the EP model of industry dynamics we describe in the Appendix how to add them to the
continuous-time model.
4.1 Discrete-Time Model
The quality ladder model assumes that there are N ¯rms with vertically di®erentiated
products engaged in price competition. Firm i produces a product of quality !i. Quality
is assumed to be discrete, i.e., !i 2 f1;:::;Mg, and evolves over time in response to
investment and depreciation. The state space is ­ = f1;:::;Mg
N. We ¯rst describe price
competition and then turn to quality dynamics.
Demand Each consumer purchases at most one unit of one product. The utility consumer
k derives from purchasing product i is g(!i) ¡ pi + ²ik, where
g(!i) =
(






; !i > 5
maps the quality of the product into the consumer's valuation for it and ²ik represents taste
di®erences among consumers. There is a no-purchase alternative, product 0, which has
utility ²0k. We assume that the idiosyncratic shocks ²0k;²1k;:::;²Nk are independently and
identically extreme value distributed across products and consumers; therefore, the demand







j=1 exp(g(!j) ¡ pj)
;
17where m > 0 is the size of the market (the measure of consumers).
Price competition In each period, ¯rm i observes the quality of its and its rivals' prod-




















of the product market game (see Caplin & Nalebu® 1991). The Nash equilibrium is found
easily by numerically solving the system of ¯rst-order conditions.
Law of motion Firm i's state !i represents the quality of its product in the present
period. The quality of ¯rm i's product in the subsequent period is determined by its
investment xi ¸ 0 in quality improvements and by depreciation. The outcomes of the
investment and depreciation processes are assumed to be stochastic. If the investment is
successful, then the quality increases by one level. Expenditures in investment enhance the
probability of success; more speci¯cally, the probability of success is ®xi
1+®xi, where ® > 0
is a measure of the e®ectiveness of investment. If the ¯rm is hit by a depreciation shock,
then the quality decreases by one level; this happens with probability ± 2 [0;1]. Note that
we di®er from the original quality ladder model of PM1 in that our depreciation shocks are
independent across ¯rms whereas PM1 assume an industry-wide depreciation shock. We do
this to focus on the key issue related to the curse of dimensionality in discrete-time models.
Combining the investment and depreciation processes, if !i 2 f2;:::;M ¡ 1g, then the















i = !i ¡ 1:





















i = M ¡ 1:
18Payo® function The per-period payo® of ¯rm i is derived from the Nash equilibrium of
the product market game and given by
¼i(x;!) ´ qi(p1(!);:::;pN(!);!)(pi(!) ¡ c) ¡ xi;
where we have subtracted investment xi from the pro¯t from price competition.
Parameterization We use the same parameter values as PM1. The size of the market
is m = 5, the marginal cost of production is c = 5, the e®ectiveness of investment is ® = 3,
and the depreciation probability is ± = 0:7. We follow PM1 in ¯rst assuming that the
discount factor is ¯ = 0:925, which corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 8.1%, and that
the number of quality levels per ¯rm is M = 18, but we also examine other values for ¯
and M in Section 5.
4.2 Continuous-Time Model
In the interest of brevity, we start by noting that the details of price competition remain
unchanged. In the continuous-time model we can thus reinterpret ¼i(x;!) as the payo®
°ow of ¯rm i.
Law of motion To make the continuous- and discrete-time models comparable, we use
the same law of motion as described for the discrete-time model. Therefore, the hazard rate
for the investment project of ¯rm i being successful is given by ®xi
1+®xi, the same choice as for
the success probability in the discrete-time model. This is appropriate since the expected
time to the ¯rst success is 1+®xi
®xi in both models. Similarly, the depreciation hazard in the
continuous-time model equals the depreciation probability, ±, in the discrete-time model.
Jumps in ¯rm i's state thus occur according to a Poisson process with hazard rate
Ái(xi;!i) =
®xi
1 + ®xi + ±;







i = !i + 1;
±
Ái(xi;!i); (!0)
i = !i ¡ 1
if !i 2 f2;:::;M¡1g. Since ¯rm i cannot move further down (up) from the lowest (highest)
product quality, we set
Ái(xi;1) =
®xi
1 + ®xi; fi(2j1;xi) = 1;
Ái(xi;M) = ±; fi(M ¡ 1jM;xi) = 1:
19Parameterization Whenever possible we use the same parameter values in the continuous-
as in the discrete-time model. Moreover, we can easily match the discrete-time discount
factor ¯ to the continuous-time discount rate ½: if ¢ is the unit of time in the discrete-time
model, then ¯ and ½ are related by ¯ = e¡½¢ or, equivalently, by ½ = ¡
ln¯
¢ . We take ¢ = 1
to obtain ½ = ¡ln¯.
5 Computational Advantages of Continuous Time
This section illustrates the computational advantages of continuous time using the quality
ladder model of Section 4 as an example. Even though this is one speci¯c example, it
is useful for many purposes. First, the results related to the curse of dimensionality are
clearly robust since they simply involve °oating point operations related to computing the
expectation over successor states. The burden of such computations depends on neither
functional forms nor parameter values. Also, as we have pointed out in Section 3.3, what
matters is the total number of coordinates of the state vector. Hence, the N-¯rm quality
ladder model should be viewed as representative of dynamic stochastic games with N-
dimensional state vectors. Second, the results related to the rate of convergence may depend
on functional forms and parameter values but there is no reason to believe that our example
is atypical. Third, we use our example to illustrate a strategy for diagnosing convergence.
Our systematic approach to devising stopping rules contrasts with the commonly used ad
hoc approaches and is thus in itself a contribution to the economics literature on numerically
solving dynamic stochastic games.
5.1 Time per Iteration
Continuous time avoids the curse of dimensionality in the expectation over successor states.
Since the algorithms for both discrete and continuous time perform this computation once
for each state and each ¯rm in each iteration, we divide the time it takes to complete one
iteration by the number of states and the number of ¯rms. Tables 1 and 2 summarize
the results for the three algorithms presented in Section 3 { the discrete-time algorithm,
the continuous-time algorithm without precomputed addresses, and the continuous-time
algorithm with precomputed addresses.9 Table 1 assumes M = 18 quality levels per ¯rm
and up to N = 8 ¯rms just as PM1 do; Table 2 reduces M to 9 in order to accommodate
a larger number of ¯rms. Both tables also report the number of states after symmetry
and anonymity are invoked,
(N+M¡1)!
N!(M¡1)! , and the number of unknowns, which equals one
value and one policy per state and ¯rm, along with the ratio of discrete to continuous time
without precomputed addresses, the ratio of continuous time without to with precomputed
addresses, and the ratio of discrete time to continuous time with precomputed addresses.
9The programs are written in ANSI C and compiled with Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 (code




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Avoiding the curse of dimensionality in the expectation over successor states yields a
signi¯cant advantage only if this particular computation takes up a large fraction of the
running time. Tables 1 and 2 show that this is the case: the discrete-time algorithm spends
more than 50% of its time on it if N = 2, about 90% if N = 4, and essentially 100% if
N ¸ 6. Hence, computing the expectation over successor states is indeed the bottleneck of
the discrete-time algorithm. The continuous-time algorithms, in contrast, spend between
33% and 72% of their time on it.
Even in its basic form the continuous-time algorithm is far faster than the discrete-time
algorithm. The gain from continuous time increases from 50% if N = 2 to a factor of 200 if
N = 8 in case of M = 18 (Table 1) and from 42% if N = 2 to a factor of 70,947 if N = 14 in
case of M = 9 (Table 2). In line with theory the computational burden grows exponentially
in N in discrete time but approximately linearly in continuous time. Consequently, the gain
from continuous time explodes in the dimension of the state vector.
Precomputed addresses yield further gains: the continuous-time algorithm without pre-
computed addresses takes about 20% to 50% more time per iteration than the continuous-
time algorithm with precomputed addresses. Compounding the gains from continuous time
and precomputed addresses yields a total gain over discrete time that ranges from 83% if
N = 2 to a factor of 278 if N = 8 in case of M = 18 (Table 1) and from 73% if N = 2 to a
factor of 103,195 if N = 14 in case of M = 9 (Table 2).
In sum, the continuous-time algorithms are orders of magnitude faster than their discrete-
time counterpart for games with more than a few state variables. Most of the gain is from
avoiding the curse of dimensionality, but the precomputed addresses, a computational strat-
egy that is e®ectively constrained to continuous time, also make a signi¯cant contribution.
5.2 Number of Iterations
While each iteration is far faster in the continuous- than in the discrete-time algorithm, this
does not prove that the equilibrium of continuous-time models is faster to compute since the
model is not solved until the iterations of the algorithm converge. Indeed, there are good
reasons to think that the continuous-time algorithm will need more iterations to converge.
Suppose that the strategic elements in the stochastic game were eliminated; in that case, the
stochastic game reduces to a disjoint set of single-agent dynamic programming problems.
Hence, a value function iteration approach (also called a pre-Gauss-Jacobi method) would






is not constant but varies with players' policies from state to state. It has a simple interpre-
tation: ´(X(!);!) is the expected net present value of a dollar delivered at the next time
Pentium M processor and 1.5GB memory running Microsoft Windows XP Professional.
23the state changes if the current state is ! and players' policies are X(!). This is easily seen




¼ 1 ¡ ½ = 1 + ln¯ ¼ ¯:
In general, if the discount rate ½ is large or if the hazard rate Á(X (!);!) is small, then
´(X(!);!) is small and there is a strong contraction aspect to a value function iteration
approach. However, ´(X(!);!) could be close to one if the discount rate is small or if the
hazard rate is large, in which case a value function iteration approach would converge slowly.




in the special case of independent transitions, this
in particular suggests that convergence could be slow if the number of players N is large.
The above facts lead us to worry about the rate of convergence of the continuous-time
algorithm. A fair comparison between the discrete- and continuous-time algorithms requires
a careful application of accuracy estimates and stopping rules. Let V i(!) and Xi(!) denote
the value and policy of player i in state ! at the beginning of an iteration and ^ V i(!) and
^ Xi(!) his value and policy at the end of the iteration. We need a measure of the distance
between two sets of value functions. We want this measure to be unit-free and to describe










^ V ¡ V











^ V i(!) ¡ V i(!)










Table 3 compares the discrete- and continuous-time algorithms.10 It presents the number









are below a prespeci¯ed tolerance of either 10¡4 or 10¡8.11 In addition, Table 3
presents the number of iterations until the distance between the current iterate ^ V and ^ X
and the \true" solution V1 and X1 is below a prespeci¯ed tolerance. To obtain V1 and X1
we ran the algorithm until the distance between subsequent iterates failed to decrease any








were less than 10¡13
and, in some cases, less than 10¡15. The ¯nal iterates were considered the true solution
since they satis¯ed the equilibrium conditions essentially up to machine precision.
In light of our previous discussion we expect the number of iterations to be sensitive
to the number of ¯rms and the discount factor. Hence, Table 3 assumes N 2 f3;6;9;12g
and ¯ = e¡½ 2 f0:925;0:98;0:99;0:995g. We omit the cases with N = 12 in discrete time
because one iteration takes more than 3 hours, thus making it impractical to compute the
10Whether or not we use precomputed addresses in continuous time is immaterial for the number of
iterations to convergence.
11The starting values are V (!) =
¼(!)
1¡¯ and X(!) = 0 in discrete time and V (!) =
¼(!)




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25true solution. We see that the continuous-time algorithm needs more iterations to converge
than its discrete-time counterpart, and that this gap widens very slightly as we increase
¯ (decrease ½). On the other hand, the number of iterations needed by the discrete-time
algorithm remains more or less constant as we increase the number of ¯rms whereas the
number of iterations needed by the continuous-time algorithm increases rapidly as we go
from N = 3 to N = 6. Fortunately, the number of iterations increases slowly as we go from
N = 6 to N = 9 and remains more or less constant thereafter, so that the gap between the
algorithms stabilizes.
5.3 Time to Convergence
The continuous-time algorithm su®ers an \iteration penalty" because ´(X(!);!) substan-
tially exceeds the discrete-time discount factor ¯. Even though the continuous-time algo-
rithm needs more iterations, the loss in the number of iterations is small when compared to
the gain from avoiding the curse of dimensionality. Table 4 illustrates this comparison and
the total gain from continuous time. Continuous time beats discrete time by 60% if N = 3,
a factor of 12 if N = 6, a factor of 209 if N = 9, a factor of 3;977 if N = 12, and a factor
of 29;734 if N = 14. To put these numbers in perspective, in case of the 14-¯rm quality
ladder model it takes about 20 minutes to compute the equilibrium of the continuous-time














2 1.80(-4) 1.12(-4) 1.73 0.93 1.61
3 1.42(-3) 8.83(-4) 2.88 0.56 1.60
4 1.13(-2) 4.43(-3) 6.10 0.42 2.54
5 8.78(-2) 1.70(-2) 14.57 0.36 5.18
6 6.42(-1) 5.34(-2) 37.12 0.32 12.03
7 4.44(0) 1.47(-1) 98.26 0.31 30.19
8 2.67(1) 3.56(-1) 249.38 0.30 74.94
9 1.66(2) 7.95(-1) 709.04 0.29 208.85
10 9.28(2) 1.77(0) 1800.00 0.29 523.72
11 4.94(3) 3.30(0) 5187.50 0.29 1498.33
12 2.46(4) 6.18(0) 13770.00 0.29 3977.26
13 1.27(5) 1.13(1) 39033.56 0.29 11246.96
14 6.00(5) 2.02(1) 103195.27 0.29 29734.23
Table 4: Time to convergence. (k) is shorthand for £10k. Convergence criterion is \distance
to truth< 10¡4." Entries in italics are based on an estimated 119 iterations to convergence
in discrete time. Quality ladder model with M = 9 quality levels per ¯rm and a discount
factor of 0:925.
265.4 Stopping Rules
In practice it is rarely feasible to compute the true solution V1 and X1. Rather we compute


















in order to assess the accuracy of our computations. Table 3 suggests that
the distance to the true solution may be far greater than the distance between subsequent
iterates. Fortunately, as we show below, the two concepts are closely related, and we exploit
this fact in devising stopping rules. Note that the choice of stopping rule is especially
important since convergence is linear in the Gauss-Seidel schemes that we use to compute
equilibria.
Our approach to devising stopping rules applies some ideas from the theory of sequences.
Consider a sequence of points fzlg
1
l=0 that satis¯es
kzl+1 ¡ zlk · µkzl ¡ zl¡1k;
where µ < 1 is a contraction factor that determines the rate of convergence. Then the
distance to the limit z1 satis¯es




First, de¯ne ±l = kzl ¡ zl¡1k and suppose that ±l+1 = µ±l. Then, for all l and all k,








In our computations we observe ±l but not µ. Equation (11) gives us a way to estimate µ
from ±l, the distance between iterates l and l ¡ 1, and ±l¡k, the distance between iterates
l ¡ k and l ¡ k ¡ 1.
Next, de¯ne "l = kzl ¡ z1k. Then, approximately, we have "l = ±l=(1 ¡ µ). With ±l and
µ in hand our task is to determine the number of additional iterations k that are required









Hence, the number of additional iterations as a function of the rate of convergence is
K (µ) =
ln(¹ "=±l) + ln(1 ¡ µ)
lnµ
: (12)
It is common practice to terminate the algorithm once the distance between subsequent
iterates is below ¹ ". However, the distance to the true solution could be a factor (1 ¡

















and, along with equation (11), forms the basis of our strategy for diagnosing
convergence.
The ¯rst step is to use equation (11) to estimate the rate of convergence µ. Table 5
presents the results for discrete as well as continuous time assuming N 2 f3;6;9;12g and
¯ = e¡½ 2 f0:925;0:98;0:99;0:995g. Several remarks are in order. First, while the estimate
in principle could vary from one iteration to the next, it turns out to be nearly constant
after the ¯rst several iterations. Second, for any given N and ¯, the continuous-time rate
of convergence exceeds its discrete-time counterpart. This is in line with the \iteration
penalty" of the continuous-time algorithm. Third, the discrete-time rate of convergence
is smaller than the discount factor ¯. This re°ects the fact that we are using Gauss-








3 0.925 0.8962 0.9611
3 0.98 0.9690 0.9901
3 0.99 0.9845 0.9951
3 0.995 0.9922 0.9975
6 0.925 0.8962 0.9747
6 0.98 0.9681 0.9944
6 0.99 0.9832 0.9973
6 0.995 0.9912 0.9987
9 0.925 0.8962 0.9779
9 0.98 0.9681 0.9957
9 0.99 0.9830 0.9980





Table 5: Estimated rate of convergence. Estimated from the distance between iterations at
10¡8. Quality ladder model with M = 9 quality levels per ¯rm.
The second step is to use equation (12) to predict the number of additional iterations
required to reduce the distance to the true solution to ¹ ". Equation (12) does an excellent job
here. For example, if N = 6 and ¯ = 0:925;0:98;0:99;0:995, then the estimated continuous-
time rates in Table 5 imply K(µ) = 144;931;2168;4910. From Table 3 the actual numbers
are 144;929;2168;4908. Overall, the discrepancy between the predicted and the actual
number of additional iterations is negligible. Devising stopping rules without knowing the
28true solution is feasible; indeed, a careful examination of the iteration history su±ces to
assess the accuracy of the computations.
6 Conceptual Advantages of Continuous Time
In Section 5 we have emphasized the computational advantages of continuous time. In
addition, as we discuss below, continuous time has a number of conceptual advantages.
6.1 Flexibility and Interpretability of Model Speci¯cations
Discrete-time models often have di±culty capturing dynamic phenomena. Consider, for
example, depreciation of machinery. Suppose that ¯rm i owns !i machines in the present
period and that each machine has a probability of 0:2 per period of breaking down inde-




is binomially distributed, and ¯rm
i will own anywhere between 0 and !i machines in the subsequent period. While this is a
natural way to model stochastic depreciation, it aggravates the curse of dimensionality in
discrete-time models because in an industry with N ¯rms the expectation over successor
states is comprised of
QN
i=1(1 + !i) terms. A possible shortcut is to focus on the expected
number of machines rather than their entire distribution (e.g., Benkard 2004). If a ¯rm
has 5 machines this period, then in expectation it will have 4 next period. The case of,
say, 7 machines is not as easy to model since 7(1 ¡ 0:2) = 5:6 is not an integer. One could
assume that the ¯rm will have either 5 or 6 machines next period and adjust the transition
probabilities so that the expectation equals 5:6. In this case, however, the variance of the
depreciation shock varies from state to state. In general, discrete time forces one to choose
between making a peculiar assumption about the nature of transitions or exacerbating the
curse of dimensionality.
In continuous time, by contrast, depreciation is easy to model. We just say that each
machine has a hazard rate of 0:2 of breaking down independent of other machines, so
that the hazard rate of a jump occurring in ¯rm i's state is 0:2!i. This exactly models a
stochastic exponential depreciation rate, but it does not a®ect the number of terms that
enter the expectation over successor states: since the machines owned by the N ¯rms break
down one at a time, computing the expectation over successor states involves summing over
N terms.
Besides allowing for more °exible model speci¯cations, continuous time also facilitates
their interpretation. In a discrete-time model the transition probabilities cannot exceed
one. This forces one to look for tractable functional forms. A popular choice is to assume
that the probability of an investment success is ®xi
1+®xi (e.g., PM1). This form is highly
stylized and the parameter ® is hard to interpret. In a continuous-time model it su±ces
to ensure that the hazard rates are nonnegative. For example,
¡
xi¢° is a familiar constant
elasticity form for the success hazard which can be used in continuous- but not in discrete-
29time models. The parameter ° is simply the elasticity of the success hazard with respect
to investment expenditures or, equivalently, (the negative of) the elasticity of the expected
time to an investment success. Since they are often used in empirical studies, easy-to-
interpret functional forms such as constant elasticity may also facilitate parameterizing the
model.
6.2 Richness of Stochastic Outcomes
Many dynamic stochastic games such as the quality ladder model of Section 4 restrict a
player's transitions to immediately adjacent states. This imposes a sense of continuity {
the player cannot go from state 3 to state 5 without passing through state 4 { although the
number of states is ¯nite. While often natural, this \continuity" assumption has di®erent
consequences for discrete- and continuous-time models.
In discrete-time models it implies that the state changes by at most one unit in any
given period. Hence, the minimum amount of time that is required to change the state by n
units is n periods. Discrete-time models have limited °exibility in modeling the frequency
of changes. In continuous-time models, by contrast, this \continuity" assumption just says
that the state changes by one unit at a time, but that does not constrain the number of
changes that can occur in any ¯nite interval of time. The frequency of changes is governed
by players' actions in equilibrium and not predetermined by the unit of time. Continuous
time thus allows for a much richer range of stochastic outcomes over any ¯nite interval of
time.
Figure 1 illustrates this point by comparing the equilibrium value function for the
discrete- and continuous-time version of the quality ladder model with N = 1 ¯rm. The
di®erence is largest in state ! = 1 with V (1) = 69:59 in discrete time and V (1) = 112:92 in
continuous time. The reason is that the monopolist is stuck with low quality and thus low
pro¯ts for a very long time in the discrete-time model whereas it is able to quickly reach
states with high quality in the continuous-time model.
In discrete-time models ¯ determines both the discount rate and the period length.
Hence, in order to enrich the range of outcomes over a given interval of time, one could
think about shortening the length of a period by taking the discount factor close to one.
However, as Table 3 shows, the number of iterations to convergence increases with ¯. Taking
¯ close to one is thus not a practical way to model short periods. In contrast, in continuous-
time models the length of a period is essentially zero and completely independent of the
discount rate ½.
6.3 Realism of Strategic Interactions
Discrete time may result in unrealistic patterns of strategic interactions. For example,
consider two ¯rms that are both trying to expand their capacity and assume that each
would want to cease its investment once the other succeeds. As long as the success of an






























Figure 1: Equilibrium value function. Quality ladder model with N = 1 ¯rm, M = 18
quality levels, and a discount factor of 0:925.
investment project is uncertain, in a discrete-time model there is some chance that both
¯rms succeed in a given period. This results in excess capacity that makes both ¯rms regret
their previous investments and perhaps spurns some e®orts to disinvest. In a continuous-
time model, by contrast, this cannot happen since at most one ¯rm succeeds at a given
point in time and the other promptly adjusts and ceases its investment. In short, there will
be no \mistakes" in a continuous-time model.
In a discrete-time model players are also able to respond quickly to changes in the
strategic situation provided that the length of a period is su±ciently short. However, as we
have pointed out above, practical considerations dictate high discount rates and thus long
response times. In many applications of EP's framework such as the quality ladder model
of Section 4 the state space is fairly coarse. Thus, changes typically have a large e®ect on
the environment and while a response time of a few days, weeks, or even months may be
plausible, a response time of one or more years is not. In this case continuous time yields
a more realistic description of players' ability to react swiftly to changes.
7 Concluding Remarks
Discrete-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of states su®er from a curse of di-
mensionality in computing players' expectations over all possible future states in that their
computational burden increases exponentially in the number of state variables. We de-
velop the alternative of continuous-time stochastic games with a ¯nite number of states and
demonstrate that continuous-time games avoid the curse of dimensionality, thereby speeding
up the computations by orders of magnitude for games with more than a few state vari-
ables. We further speed up the computations with precomputed addresses, a computational
strategy that is e®ectively constrained to continuous time. Besides their computational ad-
vantages, continuous-time games have conceptual advantages in terms of the °exibility and
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¯nite interval of time, and the realism of strategic interactions. Overall, the computational
and conceptual advantages of continuous-time games are substantial and open the way to
study more complex and realistic stochastic games than currently feasible.
The methods in this paper are just the beginning of what can be done to speed up
the computation of equilibria of dynamic stochastic games. In particular, extending our
continuous-time algorithms to focus on the ergodic set as suggested by PM2 may lead
to further gains in some applications. The more general observation is that computing
equilibria is just a problem of solving a large system of nonlinear equations. While the
number of unknowns is large, each unknown appears in a rather small subset of equations.
This sparse structure is implicitly used in all available methods and can be further exploited.
Since the size of the problem is typically very large, a direct application of Newton's method
or other solution methods for nonlinear equations is impractical, and some type of Gaussian
scheme is necessary. However, there are many variations of the block Gauss-Seidel scheme
that have not been explored and it is highly likely that there are some superior approaches
available. In future work we plan to examine alternative block structures, methods within
blocks, and acceleration methods.
Appendix
Below we show how to add entry and exit to the continuous-time quality ladder model
of Section 4. Recall that !i 2 f1;:::;Mg describes the quality of ¯rm i's product. To
model entry and exit, we add M + 1 to the set of ¯rm i's feasible states and assume that
!i = M + 1 designates ¯rm i as being inactive in the product market game. The state
space thus becomes ­ = f1;:::;M;M + 1g
N. Once an incumbent ¯rm exits the industry,
it transits from state !i 6= M + 1 to state (!0)
i = M + 1. It then becomes a potential
entrant that, upon entry, transits from state !i = M + 1 to state (!0)
i 6= M + 1. These
transitions are under the control of ¯rms. Speci¯cally, ¯rm i's action xi = (xi;1;xi;2) is now
a vector instead of a scalar. Let xi;1 ¸ 0 denote ¯rm i's investment in quality improvements
and let h1(xi;1) denote the hazard rate of an investment success. In addition, let xi;2 ¸ 0
denote ¯rm i's \exit intensity" if it is an incumbent ¯rm or its \entry intensity" if it is a
potential entrant. The exit (entry) intensity xi;2 translates into a hazard rate h2(xi;2) of
exiting (entering) the industry. If an incumbent ¯rm exits the industry, it receives a scrap
value. We make the scrap value a decreasing function of the exit intensity. That is, if a
¯rm is in a hurry to exit, it receives less for its assets. Hence, xi;2 can be thought of as
reducing the ¯rm's reservation price for selling its assets. Conversely, if a potential entrant
enters the industry, it pays a setup cost, which we take to be an increasing function of the
entry intensity.
The details of entry and exit are as follows: Suppose ¯rst that ¯rm i is an incumbent
¯rm, i.e., !i 6= M + 1. Jumps in ¯rm i's state occur according to a Poisson process with
hazard rate
Ái(xi;!i) = h1(xi;1) + ± + h2(xi;2);









i = !i + 1;
±
Ái(xi;!i); (!0)
i = !i ¡ 1;
h2(xi;2)
Ái(xi;!i); (!0)
i = M + 1
if !i 2 f2;:::;M ¡ 1g.12 Note that the last line captures the possibility of exit. Upon exit
the incumbent ¯rm receives a scrap value and the instantaneous change in wealth is
©i(x;!i;!¡i;M + 1;
¡
!0¢¡i) = · ¡ xi;2:
More elaborate speci¯cations are possible, e.g., the value of a ¯rm's assets may depend on
its state as in ©i(x;!i;!¡i;M + 1;(!0)
¡i) = ·(!i) ¡ xi;2, where ·(!i) is a (presumably
increasing) function of !i.
Suppose next that ¯rm i is a potential entrant, i.e., !i = M +1. It is natural to assume
that a potential entrant cannot invest in order to improve the quality of its product before it
has actually entered the industry. Jumps in ¯rm i's state thus occur according to a Poisson
process with hazard rate
Ái(xi;M + 1) = h2(xi;2);
and when a jump occurs, ¯rm i's state changes according to the transition probability
fi(!ejM + 1;xi) = 1;
where !e 2 f1;:::;Mg is the (exogenously given) initial quality of a ¯rm's product. Upon







Finally, since a potential entrant is inactive in the product market game, its payo® °ow is
¼i(x;M + 1;!¡i) = 0:
The above formulation of entry and exit di®ers from the one proposed by PM1. In the
background of their model is an in¯nite pool of potential entrants. Among these potential
entrants one is selected at random in each period and given a chance to enter the industry.
The potential entrant is therefore short-lived and bases its entry decision solely on the value
of immediate entry; it does not take into account the value of deferred entry. In addition,
PM1 assume that by exiting the industry an incumbent ¯rm de facto exits the game. In
contrast, we assume that there is a ¯xed number of ¯rms and that each ¯rm may be either
an incumbent ¯rm or a potential entrant at any given point in time. Moreover, when
exiting the ¯rm takes the possibility that it may enter the industry at some later point into
account and, conversely, when entering the ¯rm takes the possibility that it may exit the
industry at some later point into account. Exiting is thus tantamount to \mothballing"
and entering to resuming operations. The advantage of this formulation of entry and exit
is that it leads to a game with a ¯nite and constant number of players. Whether one uses
our formulation or the one proposed by PM1 is immaterial for the purposes of this paper
12As discussed in Section 4, if !
i = 1 or if !
i = M, then the hazard rate and the transition probability
need to be adjusted.
33since the computational advantages of continuous time are exactly the same in both.
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